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 The nation‟s security strategy tends to be reactionary to a specific event. It is rare 
when established policies have proven successful, even though there is substantial 
financial and resource investment. The payoff is measured by analyzing the desired 
minimal effect rather than prevention of the event altogether. Such is the case in 
combating explosives-related threats. 
 Today, research and development, science and technology, are plugged as the 
saviors of a post-blast event. Synthetic and composite materials are used to strengthen 
barriers and cutting-edge technology is utilized to refine the latest in standoff detection. 
These legitimate measures provide a sense of security for those who are “protected.” By 
establishing acceptance that the blast will occur, a facility‟s infrastructure and occupants 
fall into a specific category where minimizing is the accepted goal, rather than blast 
prevention being the ultimate objective. Although massive walls can act as a deterrent to 
terrorist attacks, evil doers are capable of breaching those barriers both from the exterior 
and interior. Therefore, a more logical goal of preventing the blast must be emplaced. 
 Like safety, where the aim is to prevent injury, explosives training must be 
implemented to enhance a site‟s capabilities to deter possible attacks. This paper 
investigates the current practices in explosives recognition and awareness (ERA) training, 
the availability of such training to pertinent security personnel and first responders, the 
tactics utilized to mitigate explosives events and develops a comprehensive psychological 
training mechanism, site awareness of firing and explosives devices (SAFE-D), on which 
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 During the past decade, billions of American dollars have been spent to combat 
explosives-related threats. The focus of this investment has been, and continues to be, the 
funding for better explosives detection technologies and improved barrier systems. Just in 
2010 alone an abundance of the nation‟s treasure has gone to fund extraordinary sensor 
technology in hopes of easing citizens‟ safety concerns. These investments include $215 
million allocated for the 2011 budget for the purchase of body scanners to be utilized at 
airports. This initiative was sparked by the alleged high-explosive detonation attempt by 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aboard an aircraft on Christmas 2009 in which some 
officials believe the X-ray device would have revealed the explosive (HSNW, 2010). 
Interestingly, this funding is earmarked despite privacy concerns that may eventually 
reach the United State Supreme Court. The attempt was foiled by courageous passengers 
and poor execution on Abdulmutallab‟s part.  
 Other recent funding includes over $1 billion for explosives detection systems 
allocated from the Transportation Security Administration‟s (TSA) share of the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and a 2010 budget of over an additional $1.5 
billion for purchase and installation of explosive detection systems (HSNW, 2010). These 
are substantial investments for equipment that may give false positives or negatives or 
simply may not work at all, especially at safe standoff distances. Further, there may be 
legitimate concerns other than privacy and cost. Some technologies may use radiation, 
may be incompatible with existing screening techniques or may be limited as to what 
type of explosive or explosive residue it can detect. Therefore, it is essential that site 
security professionals, facility managers and owners and operators consider low-cost, 
effective approaches to raise explosives-related threat awareness, and equip their 
employees with the knowledge of how to recognize those threats. It is the goal of this 
research to investigate current practices of human perception and to develop a 
foundational training program on which companies can build a practical and testable site 
security plan that addresses explosives-related threats and aids to alleviate complacency. 
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1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 The concentration on bulk and trace detection sensors and systems at standoff is a 
legitimate research venture for mitigating the risk of an explosives event, as is the 
manufacturing of superb barrier systems. Like detection systems, many companies, and 
vast amounts of financial support, are directed to the development, testing and 
improvement of blast resistant barriers. Schools such as Missouri University of Science 
and Technology (Missouri S&T), an engineering university located in Rolla, Missouri, 
continue to create and test astonishing blast resistant materials. Again, millions of dollars 
are invested to perfect the physical protection against substantial improvised explosives 
devices (IEDs).  
 Alternatively, a mindset accepting of the premise that explosives events will occur 
must also be subjected to scrutiny. Neither this author, nor any reasonable person, will 
logically argue that all events, such as crime, can be prevented. However, the ultimate 
goal must be just that. This same philosophy applies to any safety program. For 
occupational safety purposes an employer encourages a zero-accident policy although the 
occasional smashed finger will occur. The realistic and achievable end state must be that 
of risk acceptance and mitigation as discussed in Section 3. But facility managers must 
set their aim to the pinnacle of safety and not toward the inevitability of the event. They 
must act in the interest of protecting their employees, contractors, visitors and 
infrastructure and continue to implement economically viable and practiced procedures to 
ensure site safety. The federal government‟s explosives-related threat focus, albeit noble, 
should not be the sole protection on which a company relies. Although federal agencies 
have enjoyed many successes stopping potential terrorist attacks, they have received their 
share of criticism as well.  Considering that the United States alone uses billions of 
pounds of explosives annually, and in some cases, as discussed in Section 2, those 
explosives are accessible to egregious employees, facility managers must develop a 
hybrid approach to mitigate the threat. This concentration should not only involve the 
best available proven technology, but also a component of explosives education and 
training. Throughout this composition, clear parallels will liken ongoing procedures in 
varying industrial practices to the creation of SAFE-D.  
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 Certainly, the focus of this composition is not to discourage the continued 
development of bulk and trace detection sensors and systems and blast resistant barriers, 
but rather the aim is to investigate the lack of genuine psychological explosives-related 
threat training for security forces, first responders, employees, researchers and 
contractors. The initial focus for site security, especially at structures like hospitals and 
schools, must address the attitude and behavior of those charged with protecting others 
and establishing a climate in which explosives and explosives components can be 
recognized, an explosives event can be avoided and those assigned with site security are 
continuously alert to the explosives-related threat. 
 
1.2. INFORMATION SHARING 
In order to properly address the pertinence of explosives-related threat training to a 
facility, there first must be an investigation into the current state of information gathering 
and sharing. Explosives recognition and awareness (ERA) training, specifically being 
able to identify basic components of explosives material and possible detonators, as well 
as understanding the common characteristics of high explosives and the result of a 
significant blast, must address typical concerns of site managers. The training must: 
 Establish a common explosives vocabulary 
 Be continuously improved and tested  
 Address site specifics and professional roles 
 Cover the risk management process 
 Create a basic knowledge of explosives components 
 Be available and cost effective to obtain 
 Be incentive-based rather than punitive 
 Receive participant feedback regarding attitude and behavior. 
These criteria are analyzed further in this work. 
 Historically, training that targets ERA both in the public and private domains has 
been protected, expensive or non-existent. Despite the concentration for development of 
explosives detection, especially since the September 11
th
 attacks on the United States, 
sharing information regarding explosives and explosives-related threats has been a 
contested issue. As discussed in Section 2.2, even federal agencies tasked with such 
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training tend to draw fire for jurisdictional issues and poor tactics and implementation of 
policy when working with other entities. What‟s more, the attacks in 2001, and not so 
much the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City attack have 
created an international stigma regarding explosives. Drastic and immediate measures 
such as the Safe Explosives Act (SEA) of 2002 were common results of 9-11 and the 
push for better explosives detection technology has been reinforced publically by the 
2001 and 2009 attempted attacks by shoe bomber Richard Reid and the aforementioned 
Abdulmutallab, respectively. While the attack on the A.P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City didn‟t seem to spawn sudden panic regarding explosives detection, it did 
change the way in which the federal government evaluated its own vulnerabilities. 
 Within two months of the Oklahoma City attack, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), along with several other federal agencies, released its “Vulnerability Assessment 
of Federal Facilities.” The report was the initial effort to be undertaken by the General 
Services Administration (GSA) to outline physical security measures and construction 
regulations of government structures. While its primary focus was that of physical 
security, it did spawn several subsequent standards that strengthened total security 
measures. The DOJ report also created an awareness that security training must be taken 
into consideration as well, although explosives-related training was not specifically 
offered as a performance-based measure. In his paper, “Anti-Terrorism: Criteria, Tools & 
Technology,” Joseph Smith of Applied Research Associates, Inc. points out that “it is 
important to remember that security protection issues must be examined as a whole” 
(Smith, 2003). Smith also acknowledges that “The best defense against death and injury 
from bombing attacks is to prevent the attack from occurring (Smith, 2003).” 
 Understandably, preventing every attack should be the goal, but as history has 
shown, it may not be possible. Nonetheless, making the training and information sharing 
a priority can significantly reduce the risk of an attack. 
 As explosives threats continue to be classified as terrorism and occasional acts of 
war employed by states, it is prudent to mention that numerous terroristic activities are 
simply criminal acts committed by the unlawful. Even during combat operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan troops find themselves policing up the undesirables of the population. 
Notably, within this population there is an abundance of lawlessness as well as available 
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explosives material to carry out attacks. Therefore, it is crucial that both public, 
specifically law enforcement, and private sectors meld together not only the training 
needed to mitigate the risk of explosives-related threats, but also the intelligence required 
to direct the effort toward pre-blast mitigation rather than post-blast response. Many 
professionals, both in academia and industry, insist that this approach in enabling 
response and security officials with knowledge will pay dividends in stopping attacks 
altogether. Kathleen Kiernan, who participated in a committee workshop sponsored by 
the National Research Council, shares this perspective. Kiernan points out by stating that 
more involvement in information sharing can lead to a definition of what right looks like. 
It‟s this philosophy, also exhibited by the military and law enforcement, which could give 
those responsible for site security the necessary gut instincts which “would be helpful in 
detecting IED-related anomalies (National Research Council, 2008).” 
 John Groves, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and professor at Drury 
University at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, agrees with Kiernan‟s assessment. Groves, 
which has over 40 years of law enforcement experience, states that one of the most 
significant flaws in addressing such threats is a lack of information sharing between 
competing agencies (Groves, 2010). The nation‟s own Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has specifically addressed this need in its 2010 budget; allocating $260 million of 
its $42.7 billion to “fortify our intelligence system by improving information sharing and 
analysis by potentially adding thousands more state and local level intelligence 
analysts” (U.S. Government (OMB), 2010).  
 The philosophy and the investment coincides with the federal government‟s intent 
on providing a more solid information framework in which all pertinent entities can 
establish an intelligence and training dialogue for the good of preventing an explosives 
attack. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created a federal mandate for agencies to 
share certain information (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Audit Division, 2009). Subsequent efforts would further hone that concentration toward 
explosives. In 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD 19) outlined the 
national policy “to counter the threat of explosive attacks aggressively by coordinating 
Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal government efforts and collaborating with the 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, prevent, detect, 
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protect against, and respond to explosive attacks” (Department of Homeland Security, 
2009). Sectors involved with operating critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) 
have developed a unique response to this collaboration under this and other directives, 
which is discussed in Section 2.1.   
Although this is the obvious position of the United States, it seems that the 
implementation of the directive along with the availability of realistic and effective 
explosives training is much more complicated. However, there has been some movement 
on the directive which is revisited in Section 2.1. Still, the horror exists that the nation 
will suffer once again an unimaginable attack, with the use of explosives, such as the 
Beslan, Russia school tragedy in September 2004. In this vicious attack, over 300 
innocent victims, more than half of which were children, were massacred in a three-day 
standoff in which several dozen terrorists used firearms and IEDs. In his book, Terror at 
Beslan, author and special operations instructor for an antiterrorism advisory group, John 
Giduck, argues that the attack may be an indication of what is to come in America. 
Giduck also claims to have attempted to offer his expert analysis of Beslan to officials at 
the DHS; although this offer was never entertained (Giduck, 2005). Retired Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman wrote the foreword for Giduck‟s book. In his words, 
Grossman, who is a former West Point psychology professor and expert witness in the 
government‟s case against Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, projects that the 
lessons learned at Beslan must be applied to protect America‟s children from a similar 
attack. The true enemy in Beslan, just three short years after 9-11, was the complacency 
established in an already volatile state. Grossman further echoes Giduck‟s analysis that 
those lessons include the implementation of comprehensive site security married with a 
coordinated response. He states that children are the nation‟s most important resource and 
that the most crucial task for America is “to protect our young” (Giduck, 2005). This 
coincides with the DHS objective if America‟s young is considered a key resource and 
America‟s schools are valuable infrastructure. 
 In the summer of 2010, the DHS moved again to improve the crosstalk between 
agencies on all government levels. As part of its Counter Improvised Explosive Device 
(CIED) Risk Communications initiative, the Human Factors Division of the DHS Science 
and Technology component is funding a phased project to improve information sharing 
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about IED events (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Again, this is a 
technologically-driven project that aspires to provide computer-based training scenarios 
to all civil authorities and not an ERA initiative. As discussed in Section 2.1, CIED also 
fulfills requirements outlined in HSPD 19. The DHS has other projects that address ERA 






2.1. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
 Since it was created in 2001 by President George W. Bush, the DHS has played a 
major role in protecting the nation. The department is tasked with numerous aspects of 
national security, including border and transportation security, law enforcement and 
emergency response. In more recent times, the DHS has been active in defining and 
regulating specific industries that hold vital interests for the nation‟s operational 
capabilities. It is certainly pertinent to investigate that role when considering explosives-
related threats in the country as the DHS is a major hub in dealing with mitigating risk 
from those threats. The DHS risk assessment model is reviewed in Section 3.1. 
 Although substantial effort to create the office was in place prior to the September 
11
th
 attacks, it wasn‟t until shortly after the attacks that the Office of Homeland Security 
was activated. The office, headed by former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, was 
tasked to “oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country 
against terrorism, and respond to any future attacks” (Borja, 2008). That fall, President Bush 
issued the first HSPD, which created the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and further 
defined the agency‟s role (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The following 
year, the organization was propped up as a department of the federal government and 
since then there has been 25 HSPDs issued.  
 Perhaps the best known directive is HSPD 3 which established the Homeland 
Security Advisory System. Enacted in March of 2002, the system uses a five-tier, color-
coded classification to determine the nation‟s threat level and the protective measures 
associated with each. According to the DHS website, where a more comprehensive 
explanation of each level can be found, the goal is “to inform all levels of government 
and local authority, as well as the public, to the current risk of terrorist acts.” Figure 2.1 is 
an example of the warning system with each tier (U.S. Department of Homeland 






Figure 2.1. The Homeland Security Advisory System 
 
 
 Since the threat level advisory system has been implemented, the system has 
peaked at the orange level several times, typically due to intelligence gathered from 
suspected terrorists. The aviation threat level has peaked at red and normally remains at a 
higher level for the transportation-specific sector. The chronology and recent status of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System is a useful tool for facility managers to gain a 
general awareness of the nation‟s threat status, but operators must establish their own 
means of adjusting a facility‟s alert system. This can be accomplished simply by audible, 
multi-media-based systems. The system can be updated to address a variety of situations 
such as pending severe weather, public unrest and demonstrations, disgruntled employees 
or financial breakdown. These threat levels should be part of the local emergency 
response plan (LERP) and coincide with law enforcement‟s ability to respond to a 
potential event.  
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 The DHS has several components, many of which are law enforcement. Like most 
governmental agencies, there is vast bureaucracy involved in determining jurisdictional 
control.  Table 2.1 shows the Department components and brief description of their 
particular function (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
 
 
Table 2.1. DHS components 
Components Principle Duties 
Directorate for National Protection and Programs Risk-reduction 
Directorate for Science and Technology Research and development 
Directorate of Management Budget and expenditures, HR 
Office of Policy Coordination and planning 
Office of Health Affairs Medical activities 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis Information and intelligence 
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning Monitoring federal security 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Law enforcement training 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Multi-level nuclear detection 
Transportation Security Administration Transportation systems protection 
United States Customs and Border Protection Protecting the country‟s borders 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Immigration policies 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Border and infrastructure security 
United States Coast Guard Ports and waterways security 
Federal Emergency Management Agency Hazard preparedness 




 Under Science and Technology resides the Directorate‟s Explosives Division. Not 
surprisingly, the division‟s main focus is directed around technological advancement and 
not centered on developing ERA. According to the Explosives Division website, the unit 
is seeking “effective techniques to protect our citizens and our country‟s infrastructure 
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against the devastating effects of explosives by seeking innovative approaches in 
detection, and in countermeasures” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Under the 
objectives of the division is a training initiative for canines, an applicable approach for 
facility managers as well and a discussion topic in Section 5. 
As one can see, the main branches of the DHS are extensive and redundant in 
regards to expertise. A brief overview of this particular agency serves to highlight the 
DHS‟s functionality and set the foundation for historic and future goals as pertained to 
fundamental explosives training in both the public and private realm. 
   
2.1.1. HSPDs 19 and 7: the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.   
Authored in early 2007, the intent for HSPD 19 was to further define the nation‟s policy 
in combating terroristic explosive threats. The government names the following 
concentrations in achieving this goal:  
 applying techniques of psychological and behavioral sciences in the analysis of 
potential threats of explosive attack;  
 using the most effective technologies, capabilities, and explosives search 
procedures, and applications thereof, to detect, locate, and render safe explosives 
before they detonate or function as part of an explosive attack, including detection 
of explosive materials and precursor chemicals used to make improvised 
explosive or incendiary mixtures;  
 applying all appropriate resources to pre-blast or pre-functioning search and 
explosives render-safe procedures, and to post-blast or post-functioning 
investigatory and search activities, in order to detect secondary and tertiary 
explosives and for the purposes of attribution;  
 employing effective capabilities, technologies, and methodologies, including blast 
mitigation techniques, to mitigate or neutralize the physical effects of an 
explosive attack on human life, critical infrastructure, and key resources; and  
 clarifying specific roles and responsibilities of agencies and heads of agencies 
through all phases of incident management from prevention and protection 
through response and recovery (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).  
12 
 
The first goal is perhaps the most revealing aspect of this strategy, and likely the 
least acted upon at the local level. Modern potential threat includes a variety of assailants 
and not just radical terrorists as defined by the public‟s perception. Militia groups, 
disgruntled employees, teenaged delinquents, activists, previously convicted criminals 
and religious fanatics all can be terrorists. The psychological and behavioral approach, 
however, takes a commonality among potential threats and concentrates the security 
response toward actions rather than appearance and association. The DHS, as mentioned 
in previous sections, has taken policy measures to ensure a broad approach is considered 
when combating explosives-related threats.   
Another interesting area is the final goal. When it comes to an explosives event, 
the federal government continues to struggle with not only the proper response, but also 
the ensuing investigation as well. To date, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) have struggled to work 
within a clearly defined capacity when responding to explosives attacks and have toiled 
over the implementation of the government‟s policies. Each also has had astounding 
victories in stopping potential terror attacks. It is worthy to note that there exists other 
directives and policies that relate to this subject, however, a comprehensive investigation 
of these would deviate from the focus of this composition.  
While policy implementation is an obvious problem not all of the federal 
initiatives have been rejected from the cause nor have they stemmed ambiguity in 
determining clear objectives The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has 
developed a model for site security that could be manipulated to fit any facility‟s needs. 
Responding to HSPD 7, the purpose of the 2009 NIPP is to appoint the DHS the 
leading governmental entity in defining CIKRs and working with private sectors to 
ensure those assets are protected for the good of the nation. More specifically, the NIPP‟s 
goal is to: 
“ Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, 
neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, 
incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation‟s CIKR and to strengthen national 
preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack, 
natural disaster, or other emergency” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
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The NIPP, developed under former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, outlines a 
comprehensive collaboration between a federal Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) and its 
CIKR sector. Appendix A is a table from the NIPP that shows the agencies and sectors. 
The NIPP further highlights utilization of risk management, as discussed in Section 3, 
and continues to establish a working rapport between the private and public sectors 
through the implementation of site security plans to protect the country‟s critical 
resources. The plan is quite extensive, covering the scope of 18 identified CIKRs, 
assigning areas of responsibility for specific agencies and revisiting HSPD 19. In the 
plan, the Secretary of Homeland Security identifies the Office of Infrastructure Protection 
(IP) as the coordinating group for explosives-related events. The IP is tasked specifically 
with improving the effort to address IED-specific threats by “coordinating national and 
intergovernmental IED security efforts; conducting requirements, capabilities, and gap 
analyses; and promoting information-sharing and IED security awareness” (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2009); all of which are reoccurring themes on the national level. 
The NIPP also revisits several aspects of the DHS‟s role by stressing many points 
of HSPD 19 and how the departmental crosstalk should coincide with the private sectors 
obligated to protect resources and infrastructure. It also describes the need for better 
information sharing, as stated in Section 1. The NIPP addresses this need by tasking the 
DHS, stating it “will establish and maintain secure information-sharing systems to 
provide law enforcement agencies and other first-responders with access to detailed 
information that enhances the preparedness of Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial 
government personnel to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive 
attacks in the United States” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The 
aforementioned CIED Risk Communications initiative is a step in the right direction for 
crucial information sharing. The NIPP also creates a working relationship to allow CIKR 
sectors to develop site security plans, which are evaluated by the DHS on risk-based 
performance measures (RBPMs). This approach allows a facility to develop its unique 
plan, rather than having the execution of that plan dictated exclusively by the 
government.  
As part of its CIKR learning series, the DHS sponsors ongoing training events and 
webinars to assist private sector facility operators to hone their site security to an 
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acceptable level. In November 2009, Michael Norman, the IP Field Operations Branch 
Chief and manager of the Protective Security Advisor (PSA) program presented a web-
based training session explaining the branch and departmental role in providing site 
assistance visits (SAVs). The purpose of SAVs is to assist a facility in the assessment of 
its comprehensive security plan. The SAV concentrates on three aspects: physical 
security, security management and the security force. The visit, part of a vulnerability 
assessment, is guided under the PSA assigned to that region or state. Without having 
taken part in such an assessment, this author is unaware of the weight explosives training 
contributes to the security force.  
The methodology of the survey is rather complex and involves hundreds of 
variables with respect to the three security areas. The entire process is extensive, but the 
gist is “to provide a valuable tool back to the owner/operator” in order to appropriately 
assess the security risks (Norman, 2009). The assessment is designed to allow facility 
managers to direct security efforts under DHS recommendations, conveyed to the facility 
as a protective measure index (PMI). The feedback assigns a numerical ranking to each 
area of security and allows the operator to manipulate data to adjust security efforts to the 
need of the facility. This tool, also known as the Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST), is the 
premise of site awareness and training and should be coupled with the site‟s 
comprehensive risk management process. In fact, this approach can be accomplished on a 
local level with many security upgrade solutions developed as no-cost alternatives by the 
facility‟s own employees. This empowerment seems to be the standard for at least one 
sector working to improve infrastructure protection against terrorists. 
 
2.1.2. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Case Study.  As discussed  
in the previous section, there are 18 different sectors for which the DHS provides SSAs. 
Perhaps the most impressive effort to date in fulfilling security requirements is the 
Chemical Sector‟s approach to facilities security as outlined by the DHS. The program, 
established in 2007, is known as the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard 
(CFATS). The CFATS regulation is quite extensive, and given its current 
implementation, is not completely understood by industry. The methodology of CFATS, 
however, is the primary focus for relating chemical facility TTPs to other facilities 
15 
 
seeking to combat explosives-related threats. Nonetheless, a brief history regarding the 
participants and creation of CFATS is pertinent. As with any new regulation, there are 
numerous consultants in line to assist each company in achieving the standard. Like risk 
management though, many of these facilities may have the expertise they need to not 
only meet the goals of CFATS, but also to develop their own standards that exceed the 
federal regulation. 
 In 2004, a conglomerate of chemical sector professionals formed the industry‟s 
Sector Security Council (SSC). This council, now comprised of 15 organizations and 
corporations, including the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), partners directly 
with the DHS in forming a union that addresses concerns within the industry and national 
security. The SSC is also aiding the industry by “developing new initiatives to share 
information and best practice; and enacting the regulations under CFATS” (Summit 
Gazette, 2010). The council also works with the DHS in organizing an annual meeting of 
professionals known as the Chemical Sector Security Summit. In 2010, the fourth annual 
summit convened in Baltimore, Maryland, for two days of discussion, training, business 
interaction and information sessions. The summit, designed to enhance the 
communication of CFATS inquiries from the industry to DHS, succeeded in clearing the 
goals of the standard creating a venue for professionals to discuss concerns in applying 
CFATS to their facility. The DHS acknowledges this success as well.   
The SSC, as well as the industry, receives tremendous praise from the DHS for its 
continuing efforts to bring security of CIKR to the forefront. In his remarks to summit 
participants, DHS IP Assistant Secretary Todd Keil states the “conference is a model for 
the type and level of engagement we need if we are going to safeguard the Nation‟s 
critical infrastructure” (Chemical Sector Security Summit Remarks, 2010). Homeland 
Security Secretary Janet Napolitano attended the event as well, praising the NIPP, SSC 
and CFATS as “Flexible, practical, and collaborative programs” that “play a key role in 
enhancing the security and resiliency of our nation‟s chemical facilities and other critical 
infrastructure” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Through the chemical SSA, 
the industry also focuses somewhat on ERA. 
Throughout the first of half of 2010, the chemical sector SSA sponsored several 
Chemical Sector Explosive Threat Awareness Training (CSETAT) programs. The course 
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is a six-module, one-day event geared to offer chemical facility security personnel a 
closer look at IEDs and to enhance the “chemical sector‟s ability to deter, prevent, detect, 
protect against, and respond to attacks that use IEDs”  (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010). This training is unique to the chemical sector and provides facility 
managers a psychological edge in ERA by incorporating a legitimate threat to crucial 
infrastructure, a focus again echoed in Section 5. The training revisits the NIPP and 
applicable HSPDs, as well as trends in terrorism, IED and VBIED (vehicle-borne IED) 
design, incidents and explosive effects, IED trends, indicators and detection, and 
surveillance detection (Miller, 2010). This approach psychologically prepares the security 
officials within the industry with a foundation of IED knowledge that can be married with 
a basic understanding of explosives components. The program also updates CFATS as 
well. Appendix B shows the CSETAT information flyer for 2010. The program is slated 
to continue again in 2011. Besides, the aforementioned program, the DHS has other 
explosive initiatives as well. 
 
2.1.3. Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats. Additional  
programs under the office include the Office of Bomb Prevention‟s “Tripwire,” which is 
an information and IED communication medium; the multi-jurisdictional IED site plan 
(MJIEDSP), which allows communities to share and respond to events; and perhaps the 
department‟s most legitimate effort to enhance ERA, the Center of Excellence (COE) for 
the Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats or ALERT. 
 Originating in 2008, ALERT is a multi-agency effort that includes not only 
governmental involvement, but also academia and industrial participation. Some of the 
nation‟s most renowned research facilities, along with successful research corporations 
and esteemed S&T institutions, have combined to form a comprehensive educational 
approach to explosives threats. Albeit a concerted technological venture, ALERT is a 
copacetic opportunity to establish a joint concentration aimed at bringing ERA to the 
forefront of technology, in both detection and blast mitigation. The program also focuses 
on developing future experts in the explosives field by developing recruiting plans to 
entice potential law enforcement professionals into the realm of advanced explosives 
training.   
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 Northeastern University in Boston and the University of Rhode Island are leading 
the COE‟s effort to bring to the table all entities with a legitimate interest in explosives 
detection and characterization and blast mitigation. ALERT specifically is geared to 
“conduct transformational research, technology and educational development for 
effective characterization, detection, mitigation and response to the explosives-related 
threats facing the country and the world” (Northeastern University, 2010). As mentioned, 
ALERT has an impressive core partnership as well. The Northeastern University website 
lists all the affiliates as of 2010. Those participants are listed in Table 2.2. 
 
 
Table 2.2. ALERT partners 
Academic 
Boston University, California Institute of Technology, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Missouri University of Science & Technology, New Mexico State 
University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Soreq Nuclear Research Center, Texas 
Tech University, University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez, Washington State University 
Strategic 
Idaho National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Massachusetts General Hospital, 
Tufts University, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 
Industrial/Governmental 
Analogic Corporation, American Science & Engineering, John Adams Innovation 
Institute, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Raytheon Company, Siemens Corporate 




 There are several other underlying participants in the program as well. As 
mentioned previously, ALERT comprises a multi-focused effort to not only explore a 
partnership with the nation‟s explosives experts, but it also defines each highly-
technological research effort. 
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 ALERT has four main research initiatives: explosives characterization, explosives 
sensors, explosives sensor systems and post-blast mitigation. Each program, recognized 
as F1, F2, F3 and F4, respectively, are strictly technology-based plans to improve 
detection and barrier systems. However, these core initiatives are married with an 
educational initiative led by the University of Rhode Island. The aim is to “establish a 
conduit that includes precollege, undergraduate, graduate and career professional 
components” and train those future leaders “who will be important contributors to DHS 
and to the success of its critical mission” (Northeastern University, 2010). That “critical 
mission” is to further develop a defense against terrorist threats using explosives and 
enhance the security for CIKR on which the nation depends. As part of this research, a 
comprehensive short-course was developed to address local security threats and is 
discussed in greater detail in Section 4. 
 The education phase of ALERT is a genuine route for law enforcement seeking to 
specialize in advance explosives training. Outside of a few universities, though, first 
responders must network on all governmental levels to gain that knowledge, unless a 
private company is compensated to provide the ERA training. Even rarer is the offer of a 
formal explosives degree or authentic certification in academia. But under the ALERT 
initiative, high-school and community college students, undergraduates and graduates can 
obtain the advanced training and education from universities such as Missouri S&T 
which offer several levels of explosives education. In fact, Missouri S&T seems ideal for 
obtaining ALERT‟s goals due to its variety in explosives education where “students have 
the exclusive opportunity to safely handle and employ explosives in various disciplines 
while pursuing either an explosives engineering emphasis or certificate, explosives 
engineering minor and an Explosives Engineering Master of Science” (Hawkins, 2010). 
Facility managers must also find ways for their security professionals to gain ERA 
training as well. As stated in the previous section, the chemical sector has made available 
such training through the DHS. 
 Obviously there is a distinctive technological concentration to mitigate 
explosives-related threats. What‟s more, there are even specialized training sessions 
available if companies know where to seek the information. But where the initiative falls 
short is on the implementation of ERA for site security and the psychological 
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attentiveness, or rather the presence of complacency and obliviousness, to the dangers 
facing communities daily. Protecting the country, and making known these threats, is a 
primary role of the federal government. 
 
2.2. FEDERAL EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATORS 
 Outside of the military, there are two primary investigating agencies when 
explosives-related threats surface on a national level. Both the FBI and ATF have distinct 
jurisdiction in intelligence gathering and post-blast investigation. The FBI has its 
Explosives Unit (EU) which is tasked with conducting “examinations of evidence 
associated with bombing matters” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). According to 
the agency, the EU is involved with bombing scenes and IED component identification. 
The FBI also has 15 explosives detection canines in its police force. These dogs are a 
viable component to a site‟s explosives security plan and, as discussed Section 5, can be 
trained exclusively on a reward system, which is difficult to execute with humans. 
Implemented over the last decade, FBI dogs are trained to detect over 19,000 explosives 
compounds (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).  
 The FBI has the primary obligation to investigate terrorism in the United States. 
This authority has been granted throughout the last three decades, primarily through 
Presidential Directives (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Audit Division, 2009). Considering IEDs are a growing weapon of choice by terrorists, it 
stands to reason that the agency must arm itself with explosives-related knowledge and 
capabilities in order to effectively respond to possible terrorist attacks which involve 
explosives. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reports that in 2009, there 
were nearly 11,000 terror attacks worldwide (U.S. State Department, 2010). This 
alarming increase must signal to federal agencies that developing and implementing a 
sound education and response plan must be in the forefront of the national strategy. 
 From the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, a DHS COE at the University of Maryland, Figure 2.2 shows the exponential 






Figure 2.2. Terrorist usage of IEDs worldwide, 1970-2007 
 
 
 When it comes to explosives regulations, the ATF has the lead. Reassigned to the 
DOJ in early 2003 under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the ATF has been primarily 
responsible for the explosives industry. The agency‟s most legitimate explosives effort to 
date is ensuring proper storage and licenses of explosives and enforcement of the SEA of 
2002. More details about the SEA are discussed in the following section. 
 Like the FBI, the ATF has an explosives detection canine program as well. To 
date, the agency has deployed over 300 canines worldwide trained to detect similar 
compounds as the FBI trained force (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, 2010).  As with the FBI‟s EU, the ATF employs its own explosives experts. 
A Certified Explosives Specialist (CES) is tasked with conducting investigations 
regarding explosives and explosives regulations. The CES is a special agent with the ATF 
required to acquire two years of training (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, 2010). The ATF also trains Explosives Enforcement Officers (EEOs). These 
experts have more extensive duties than the CES and offer a wide range of services. From 
the ATF website, an EEO is trained in: 
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 Providing technical advice/assistance on Federal storage regulations and 
the handling or disposing of explosives; 
 Threat and infrastructure vulnerability assessments both domestically and 
abroad; 
 Constructing facsimiles of explosive devices;  
 Preparing determinations on explosive, incendiary, and destructive devices 
for court proceedings;  
 Providing expert witness testimony;  
 Conducting render safe/disassembly procedures on explosive and 
incendiary devices and materiel;  
 Conducting large scale explosive destruction operations;  
 Operational & training support to state/local, national and international 
agencies and interests;  
 Underwater explosives dive and recovery operations;  
 Research studies and analyses of explosives-related equipment and 
materiel;   
 Supporting National Special Security Events and other major events 
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2010).  
 Besides providing explosives experts, the ATF is charged with maintaining 
the Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS). This is a web-based database which 
provides all levels of law enforcement “access to national arson and explosives 
incident information” (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2010). 
While BATS seems like an extraordinary tool for explosives investigators across the 
nation, it has some issues with information sharing. These problems, as well as other 
investigative barriers between the ATF and FBI, are discussed in Section 2.2.2. As 
mentioned in previous sections, there is little doubt that the U.S. policy regarding 
explosives-related threats is firm in intention. However, like previously noted, the 
problem is not the strategy, but rather the implementation of regulations such as the 
SEA, an effort with which the ATF continues to struggle. 
22 
 
2.2.1. The Safe Explosives Act of 2002. The ATF‟s 2007 edition of Federal 
Explosives Law and Regulations incorporates extensive revisions from the SEA. 
According to then director, Michael Sullivan, the SEA was developed to ensure that 
explosives materials were protected from use in IEDs. Sullivan states in the law that 
“Security of all explosives materials is an essential tool in the war against terrorism” 
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2007). The former director 
reverts to the importance of implementing the SEA stating that the ATF takes the role in 
ensuring proper implementation of the SEA for securing explosives, but he also 
acknowledges that “internal controls and industry-created publications also support the 
secure and safe storage of explosives materials” (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, 2007).  
 This philosophy coincides with the overall premise; which is more specifically 
outlined in Section 3.2, that companies are well served to exceed standards through self-
regulating standard operating procedures (SOPs). These SOPs should be comprehensive, 
applied, practical and dynamic with continuous improvements. Methods for achieving 
this goal are outlined in Section 3.2 as well.  
 The SEA‟s main purpose is to define persons who are prohibited from receiving 
or handling explosives. Effective January 2003, the prohibited persons category was 
expanded and the ATF became more involved in guaranteeing that proper background 
checks were conducted to ensure safe explosives handling. Besides industry, this standard 
applies to academic institutions and businesses outside of military occupational 
specialties which require explosives handling. Missouri S&T‟s explosives engineering 
program conducts background checks of all students enrolled in an explosives course. 
Although the ATF has received criticism in implementing the SEA, facilities must ensure 
these checks are conducted for the safety of their employees, contractors and visitors. 
Table 2.3 has the complete list of prohibited persons (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 







Table 2.3. ATF‟s list of prohibited persons 
Prohibited Persons 
Aliens (with some exceptions)* 
Persons dishonorably discharged from the military* 
U.S. citizens who have renounced their citizenship* 
Convicted felons 
Users and addicts of controlled substances 
Fugitives 
Mental defectives or persons committed to mental institutions 
* These categories were added to the SEA 2002 
 
 
 All categories of prohibited persons may apply for relief from explosives 
disabilities by filing with the ATF. However, each company employing potential 
explosives handlers must take measures that protect the public and limit access to 
materials that can be used in an attack. Additionally, those tasked with security of a 
facility that utilizes explosives must become familiar with the regulation. This provides a 
secondary system of checks for site security, and if a company‟s security component is 
aware of those people who are permitted to handle explosives on site, then the likelihood 
that prohibited persons come in contact with explosives is reduced. 
 While the introduction of the SEA seems a worthy undertaking, the ATF has 
received severe criticism with regards to its implementation. Again, the reoccurring 
theme is not the problem with policy, as there seems to be more than an adequate 
compilation of regulations on the federal level, but rather the process of implementing 
that policy. 
 
2.2.2. Office of the Inspector General Reports. As part of the process to ensure 
 the policies of the government are properly employed; a system of studies is emplaced. 
Often times, these investigations stem from anonymous information obtained from the 
applicable industry, or the tragic consequence of a catastrophic event, such as the 9-11 
Commission. In either case, the process involves official probes into the execution of 
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lawmakers‟ intent. That jurisdiction on the national level, as it pertains to the health and 
welfare of citizens, lies with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). 
 In March 2005, the OIG published a report regarding the ATF‟s implementation 
of the SEA. The “Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives‟ 
Implementation of the Safe Explosives Act” is highly critical of the ATF‟s initial efforts 
in completing appropriate background checks for possessors of explosives and 
identifying those who may have been prohibited persons. The report, which exceeds 100 
pages, states that there are “critical deficiencies in the ATF‟s implementation of the 
background check and clearance process that prevented the agency from ensuring that 
prohibited persons are denied access to explosives” (Office of the Inspector General, 
2005). In short, there are already citizens within the community handling explosives that 
should not be. For those within the industry, this is probably not a surprise. The report‟s 
conclusions, which many have been disputed by the ATF, reinforce the idea that policy 
makers once again created a realistic avenue to combat explosives-related threats just to 
fall short in implementing the standards. In just two years since the SEA went into effect, 
the agency charged with upholding explosives regulations was bombarded with questions 
of competency. 
 Notwithstanding the intentions of the investigation, is it a fair assessment to not 
only create a system of licensing and handling with federal oversight, but also to 
encourage the lowest level of scrutiny possible. Considering the horrific consequences if 
nefarious possessors of explosives are not identified, each entity concerned with site 
security, especially vulnerable sites as hospitals and schools, must then become more 
vigilant in understanding what explosives can do and what components of IEDs may look 
like.  
 The findings by the OIG are more profound than just background checks. The 
report criticizes other aspects of the SEA‟s implementation. These conclusions range 
from delayed investigations of explosives licensees, the ATF‟s knowledge and tracking 
of prohibited persons, failure to properly train inspectors on the SEA and coordination of 
investigations with the FBI. The OIG cites that “comparison of ATF and FBI data found 
no record that the ATF requested FBI background checks on 59 of 683 employees of 
explosive licensees (9 percent) whose ATF records we examined” and it was also found 
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“that the ATF had failed to complete the background check process for over half (655 of 
1,157) of the individuals identified by the FBI as possible prohibited persons” (Office of 
the Inspector General, 2005). From the findings, it appears the FBI and ATF have done 
little to help one another, even when national security is on the line. Not surprisingly, the 
relationship between the ATF and FBI has soured the intent of the SEA as well. This is 
more evident in another OIG report. 
 In October 2009, the OIG released its “Explosives Investigation Coordination 
Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives.” Leading up to the report, the DOJ took several measures in 
clearing the explosives investigation boundaries between the ATF and FBI. As discussed 
in the 2005 report, the animosity between the two agencies might have well been created 
when the decision was made to include the ATF into the DOJ ranks, historically the 
FBI‟s turf. While the 2005 publication found fault mainly with the ATF though, in this 
more recent probe both agencies receive harsh criticism. 
 After the merger into the DOJ, the ATF was required to work together with the 
FBI under the stipulations discussed in Section 2.2. Nonetheless, a series of 
memorandums and directives from the Homeland Security Act to this latest report was 
unable to create a lucid guideline in which all involved would play nice. One of the 
primary points of contention is the authority over an explosives investigation, in which 
the OIG describes both agencies at fault. The report points out that if terror or suspected 
terror is involved, then the FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) have jurisdiction. 
The OIG backed its disputed findings with surveys conducted with agents of both 
components, a methodology used with local laws enforcement in this composition to 
analyze the effectiveness of ERA training. Even employees of the ATF and FBI agreed 
that jurisdictional disputes disrupted timely and precise investigations, with upwards of 
90-percent stating that conflict existed over which agency should lead the investigation 
(U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, 2009).  This 
sentiment has trickled down to state and local responders as well with nearly all of the 
respondents agreeing that the federal response is nothing more than an ambulance chase 
for accolades. This perception not only denies the national agencies respect, but also 
draws incongruent focus intended by the SEA. With response to explosives events being 
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the most contested issue in federal reaction, the OIG report actually contains 15 
recommendations for improving working relations between the FBI and ATF. These 
include consistencies in explosives training, the use of canines, improving BATS and 
requiring the FBI to provide information to the ATF‟s tracking database and explosives 
handling procedures (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit 
Division, 2009). 
 The OIG reports should not be used as stand-alone documents to discredit the 
national effort. Rather, facilities across the country must recognize that with significant 
flaws in protection against explosives-related threats comes the opportunity to develop a 
unique and comprehensive approach to site security. This system, coupled with the 
continued effort of the federal authority, must entail a focus on education and training 
and not just reliance that the federal government, or private security companies for that 
matter, will foil every attack; especially when there seems to be numerous flaws in 
information sharing and implementation. Facilities have an obligation to protect, and 
sometimes that protection comes at a cost. Owners and operators must make every 
reasonable attempt to create an authentic protection plan that includes information 
sharing and addresses the specific needs to the company. This effort expands well beyond 
technology. 
 
2.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 
 The United States has a robust private security industry. Many companies offer 
various training and services from which facilities managers may opt for a specialization, 
like that of the chemical sector. The availability of these products is much too vast to 
cover within this analysis. Likewise, this author has no intent of offering free advertising 
for the numerous companies offering explosives classes and training in the thousands of 
dollars. Although it is necessary to acknowledge that for a price specific explosives 
training is available. Not only will companies offer expertise in ERA, providing that the 
investment is made to obtain their product, but these same companies will also fulfill the 
risk management need. These professionals, most of which are credible and qualified, 
make substantial profit providing a company a product which is simply arranged. 
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Nonetheless, many within the industry lobby for more training and exposure to realistic 
threats in order to better protect the facility where they work and themselves. 
 In a free market society, a climate exists where those with knowledge can provide 
services for those who are willing to pay for it. Companies peddle their expertise to the 
tune of $500-$1,000 a day for explosives training. Training kits, such as IED packages 
that include simulated explosives devices, can cost in the thousands and even tens of 
thousands. There is no question that many of these resources are applicable to site 
security, however, unlike the nation‟s budget for detection systems and barriers, the goal 
of ERA training must be achieved at much lesser cost. Many local and state budgets 
simply cannot absorb the expenditure of this expensive training. But, with the proper 
network and attitude, low-cost, effective ERA training can be co-sponsored among first 
response agencies and a collaborative effort can be made to co-host either private 
companies or academic professionals to offer the applicable classes. The goal is to get 
those tasked with security a basic knowledge of explosives, not to make them experts. 
 A common question in the ERA training discussed in Section 4 is “What does an 
IED look like?” Instructors with even the basic knowledge of IEDs know that the 
mechanism can take on the appearance of countless devices, limited only to the 
manufacturers‟ imagination. Therefore, rather than spending thousands of dollars for a 
training kit, site security forces can devise their own with common items found in retail 
stores or strewn about the property. A reasonable approach to spotting out-of-the-
ordinary components is the key to ERA and not necessarily the ability to identify the 
explosives itself. Couple that focus with the use of canines and simple standoff, a 
foundation of site security has been laid at a relatively low expense. Some of these basic 
concepts and recommended solutions are outlined in Section 5. 
 In the meantime, facilities can establish communication with all levels of 
government support and begin their site assessments. They can take advantage of low-
cost approaches, like that of chemical sector‟s CSETAT, or continue to seek high-paid 
consultancy for ERA, site surveys and risk management. Until each sector defined in the 
NIPP undertakes a strict approach that encompasses diligent protection of CIKR, to 




3.  RISK MANAGEMENT 
3.1. EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT MODELS 
 Inherent in every successful operation is a comprehensive and continuous risk 
management process. Facility managers must understand the incessant nature of risk and 
how it applies to their procedures and infrastructure. Much of what is discussed about 
implementing risk management and how it pertains to every legitimate business is 
derived from the author‟s nearly two decades of military service and advanced 
knowledge of composite risk management (CRM). As with other sections of this 
composition, risk management is a crucial component of ERA and basic security needs. 
Therefore, a military model, as well as other examples, will be utilized to convey the 
importance of CRM within any environment. Additionally, owners and operators 
concerned with explosives threats will be given insight on how a distinctive change in 
attitude and behavior will pay dividends in morale, prestige and even profit. The most 
impressive aspect of CRM is the fact that it is extremely cost effective and can be 
implemented by the facility‟s own employees. The subsequent text details other 
advantages that better prepare a facility‟s security force on a psychological level. 
 
3.1.1. United States Army.  There are two basic approaches to risk; acceptance 
and mitigation. Militarily, leaders are trained to recognize a variety of hazards that may 
alter a mission or harm troops. The U.S. Army instills risk mitigation at the earliest level 
of soldier development. As with government regulations, such as the CFATS example in 
Section 2, there are countless private companies ready to offer costly consultancy to aid 
in developing a risk model for a particular entity. However, the military approach is to 
inculcate a behavior change that gives a psychological advantage to its own personnel. 
Facility operators, using this same philosophy coupled with appropriate ERA training, 
will have a tremendous psychological edge as well. As cited in the Army‟s own 
Composite Risk Management field manual, FM 5-19, CRM is an amalgamation of past 
experience and decision making that results in “teaching Soldiers [sic] „how to think‟ 
rather than telling them „what to think‟ ” (Department of the Army, HQ, 2006). The 
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subsequent text briefly outlines the military CRM model and further relates the model to 
the NIPP‟s approach as outlined by the DHS strategy on risk mitigation. 
 The Army CRM FM 5-19 is an extremely helpful tool for leaders at all levels. It 
implements an approach of reason and proven TTPs rather than a complex computer-
based application that possesses no ability to think. As well, the FM 5-19 further relates 
this suggested common-sense approach as a substitute to those believing that risk can be 
adequately wrapped into software. It states that “Technical competency, operational 
experience, and lessons-learned weigh higher than any set of alpha-numeric codes. 
Mathematics and matrixes are not a substitute for sound judgment” (Department of the 
Army, HQ, 2006). This point, not only valid, but also pertinent to any operation, is 
objectively made despite the Army‟s own use of a matrix-based assessment. The fact is 
that algorithms should be tools to aid in the CRM process and not as substitutes to logical 
thinking freely exercised by the personnel on site. Again, today there seems to be a strict 
focus on technology, like the billions of dollars spent on detection equipment and 
complex barriers, rather than a low-cost, common-sense approach. When considering the 
intrinsically catastrophic effects of an explosives event, it is unwise to trust a machine to 
dictate crisis management. The Army‟s use of CRM is a reasonable approach which 
incorporates all aspects of the process into a quick reference. As well, it assigns 
responsibility to the appropriate level of the decision-making process rather than allowing 
inexperienced leaders to accept unnecessary risk. 
 The model consists of a five-step process. This method begins by identifying the 
hazards, assessing the hazards, developing controls and making decisions, implementing 
the controls and supervising the process and evaluating the outcome. As discussed later, 
there are other models available which use similar guidelines in evaluating and managing 
risk. Figure 3.1 shows the cyclic and continuous process of the Army CRM process as 





Figure 3.1. The Army risk management model 
 
 
 The CRM model is designed to apply to any mission or operation at any level. In 
the military, a CRM worksheet is completed prior to convoys, physical fitness training, 
range qualification and any other training event.  
 Perhaps the most important part of the process is assessing the appropriate 
hazards. Like most risk management models, the Army uses two main variables as 
functions of risk to identify and attempt to quantify the hazards that may affect an 
operation. These components of risk address the likelihood the event will occur and the 
effects on personnel and equipment if it does transpire. The FM 5-19 contains specific 
definitions for each and categorizes the two criteria as probability and severity. Most 
models of risk management use some form of each category. Figure 3.2 shows the 




Figure 3.2. The Army risk management matrix 
 
 
 The probability section has five categories: frequent, likely, occasional, seldom 
and unlikely. The FM 5-19 provides leaders specific definitions for each to allow more 
objectivity in assessing the hazard (Department of the Army, HQ, 2006).  
 Frequent – Occurs very often, known to happen regularly. 
 Likely – Occurs several times, a common occurrence. 
 Occasional – Occurs sporadically, but is not uncommon. 
 Seldom – Remotely possible, could occur at some time. 
 Unlikely – Can assume will not occur, but not impossible. 
 Once the probability of the hazard is defined, leaders look into the severity of the 
event if it was to occur. Severity has four categories: catastrophic, critical, marginal and 
negligible. Definitions for the categories of severity are much more conducive to mission. 
However, a brief range from the FM 5-19 spans from “catastrophic” as total operational 
failure and death to “negligible” being little or no impact on the operation. After 
probability and severity are determined, the matrix allows leaders to join the two to 
determine an overall risk level for the mission. The risk levels are: extremely high, high, 
moderate and low.  
 The next step in the CRM is to mitigate hazards by developing and implementing 
controls to reduce the overall risk level. The highest risk hazard is the level accepted for 
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the mission. Once the risk level has been established, responsibility is assigned as to 
whether to conduct the operation or attempt to further mitigate unacceptable hazards. 
This entire process is completed on a “Risk Management Worksheet.” Appendix C is an 
example of a completed worksheet on which hazards and controls are identified for a 
company‟s rifle qualification range. The residual risk becomes the conscientious focus 
for the appropriate authority. For the military, this risk decision is based on the risk level 
and may span from a company commander for low risk training to a division commander 
for extremely high risk missions. A civilian facility or operation can mirror this process 
by allowing qualified personnel to make the appropriate decision on the low end of the 
assessment to as high as owners for the more risky decisions. For instance, an 
ammunition manufacturer may routinely assign a moderate risk to facility operations. 
However, with intelligence geared toward attacks on the facility coupled with an 
elevation in the Homeland Security Advisory System, plant managers may opt for an 
extremely high risk level. In correlation, a gate guard at the same facility may point out to 
her supervisor that visibility is obscured due to weather conditions for the day. The 
facility, not needing a plant manager to adjust the risk level, may empower that security 
supervisor to raise the risk from low to moderate. 
 The Army‟s risk management model is simplistic and easy to use. It‟s also a 
readily available tool that can be completed on all levels at any site. It is important to note 
that it is impossible to mitigate all risks and there will always be hazards present, 
identifiable or not. The purpose of assigning responsibility for the varying risk levels is to 
make the final risk acceptance authority accountable. This procedure is utilized somewhat 
by other governmental agencies as well. 
 
3.1.2. DHS Risk Management in the NIPP. The DHS model for risk 
 management is similar to that of the Army‟s and other genuine professions. This section 
contains a brief summary of the DHS risk management process and draws comparisons 
and contrasts to the military model. The procedures for mitigating risk are commonplace 
among public organizations and can easily be applied to most entities. In the NIPP, the 
risk management process is regarded as “the cornerstone” of the plan (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). It is this philosophy, that incorporating realistic risk 
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management is actually cost saving in both resources and expenditures, which generates a 
psychological advantage of prevention rather than reaction. Also like the military, the 
DHS version is a cyclic model that requires continuous assessment in order to protect 
CIKR. Figure 3.3 shows the NIPP risk management framework (Department of 




Figure 3.3. NIPP risk management framework 
 
  
 The first step to the NIPP‟s risk management model is to set goals and objectives 
considering the physical, cyber and human elements with regards to CIKR protection. 
This approach, unlike the Army model in which encompasses all justifiable risks without 
being categorized, provides a risk management focus for facility managers. The “human” 
aspect provides a psychological legitimacy of which there is an acknowledgment that 
attitude and behavior, complacency and resiliency are indeed credible functions of the 
risk management process. The goals and objectives are specific to the cause of the 
company and should be direct and well-defined. 
 Once a site properly identifies the goals, it must continue with identifying the 
resources in which a developed plan can become reality. In identifying these assets, or 
systems and networks that exist to aid the facility, a consideration must be given to the 
availability of the asset. For example, although federal explosives databases are an asset, 
specifically the BATS system discussed in Section 2.2, the usability and timely update of 
the system may not be an asset, but rather a hindrance. Nonetheless, site operators must 
take advantage of all available resources with the understanding that any one of those can 
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be made unavailable during an emergency. The more a company can put into place its 
own systems, like those discussed in the following section, the more it can rely on the 
data. 
 The next step to the NIPP framework is assessing the risk. As shown in the 
previous figure, risk is defined as a function of consequence, vulnerability and threat. 
This coincides with most basic models which consider the likelihood and severity of the 
event. As stated in the NIPP, “it is important to think of risk as influenced by the nature 
and magnitude of a threat, the vulnerabilities to that threat, and the consequences that 
could result” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The following of each definition 
comes from the NIPP text and gives clear and concise structure with regards to risk 
assessment: 
 Consequence: The effect of an event, incident, or occurrence; reflects the level, 
duration, and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the 
NIPP, consequences are divided into four main categories: public health and 
safety (i.e., loss of life and illness); economic (direct and indirect); psychological; 
and governance/mission impacts. 
 Vulnerability: Physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open 
to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. In calculating the risk of an 
intentional hazard, a common measure of vulnerability is the likelihood that an 
attack is successful, given that it is attempted. 
 Threat: Natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or 
indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, 
and/or property. For the purpose of calculating risk, the threat of an intentional 
hazard is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack being attempted by an 
adversary; for other hazards, threat is generally estimated as the likelihood that a 
hazard will manifest itself. In the case of terrorist attacks, the threat likelihood is 
estimated based on the intent and capability of the adversary. 
 
 Once again, the model contains significant similarities to the Army‟s approach 
and provides a method for calculating the risk as it applies to the facility. Even more 
crucial than assessing all possible threats is deciding which ones to mitigate in great 
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detail and which ones must be realistically accepted. This is covered in the next step of 
the framework. 
 After the risks are identified and assessed, prioritizing the most substantial and 
applicable must take place. This stage, as it pertains to CIKR covered in the NIPP, is a 
sector-specific approach on a broad level, but must take an intimate focus for a single 
site. Owners must take into account the cost effectiveness of mitigating the risk and 
which hazard should receive not only the money, but also the attention. In the Army, a 
traditional phrase of such prioritization focuses that attention as it relays time 
management to a rifle qualification. For pop-up silhouettes on the rifle range, the closer 
targets tend to stay exposed for the shorter amount of time. The farther a target, the 
longer it stays exposed. Therefore, soldiers are encouraged to engage the closest target 
first. The same applies to a company attempting to prioritize its risks. If the site is 
planning a long-term event that exposes its infrastructure or employees, proper 
consideration must spotlight the timeframe as well as the functions of risk. Put more 
simply, security officials must engage more pressing threats rather than spending time 
planning for possible future threats. This does not mean that those risks are not assessed, 
but rather that crucial resources be allocated to mitigate the immediate problem. Long-
term threats also may change in time or prove false altogether. 
 Subsequent to prioritization is implementing the plan. This is a time where the 
best possible solution has been devised to “prevent, deter, and mitigate the threat; reduce 
vulnerability to an attack or other disaster; minimize consequences; and enable timely, 
efficient response and restoration in a post-event situation, whether a terrorist attack, 
natural disaster, or other incident” (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Like 
identification of pertinent resources and assets, putting into action a risk management 
plan is subject to variables in the system. A major component of this is the cost 
effectiveness of the solution. Often times an episode could have been prevented if enough 
money was thrown at the problem. But if a company is bankrupt, the risk management 
process is moot. Therefore, cooperative training programs, employee feedback, 
psychological tools and common-sense solutions must be entertained to offset extreme 
costs. Most industries are succumbing to best-available technology to alleviate systematic 
issues, but that technology, as noted in the previous sections, can be costly and difficult to 
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utilize. The NIPP continues to extensively cover plan implementation and provides 
numerous programs on which sectors can rely. 
 Perhaps the most critical component of the DHS risk management model is 
measuring the effectiveness of the plan. This step can be achieved in many ways but must 
coincide with the intent of the goal and objective. Like the after action review (AAR) in 
the Army, timely feedback must be obtained in order to improve or abandon processes 
not accomplishing the standard. This feedback can be ascertained at any stage of the 
cycle and should come in the form of legitimate improvement to the plan rather than pure 
criticism without solution. A suggested method in quantitatively gauging the security 
effort is the test of a practical pilot. This method, as discussed in Section 5, tests security 
TTPs prior to and after ERA. Its intent is to improve procedures through statistical 
analysis of a cost-effective training program. For facilities and sectors using RBPMs, it is 
also a method of checking the success or failure of the standard. Most importantly, it 
gives owners a baseline as to whether a new plan needs to be created and implemented or 
if a proven tactic can be improved upon.  
 The risk management system is just one component, albeit a critical one, of ERA 
and how it applies to overall site security from explosives-related threats. As the need for 
training comes to light, facility managers have been given so far basic tools and 
considerations for protection against explosives events. It is up to them to establish a 
standard operating procedure. 
 
 3.2 DEVELOPING A STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
 The goal of an SOP is to establish protocol within a unit. It must exceed every 
regulatory expectation. Additionally, it must be exposed to third party review. This 
review can be from partners in the industry or even government employees. Regardless of 
the design of an SOP, it must be living proof of the procedures in which a facility 
incorporates under certain tests. Site security is just that, an essential daily test of the 
ability of the owners and operators to provide a safe environment for protection of their 
people, products and infrastructure; especially when dealing with explosives-related 
threats. This section provides examples of successfully implemented “self-regulation.” It 
also discusses monetary benefits as well as the safety measures that lead to efficiency in 
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production and public relations. In order to develop a process in which SOPs for ERA 
and site security are legitimate and detailed, companies must assume an appropriate risk 
management method and incorporate routinely a basis for review. The mining industry is 
particularly scrutinized publicly for not practicing established SOP or for blatantly 
violating federal regulations. Yet the industry has taken great strides to enhance public 
opinion of the necessary trade. The environmental impact of mining, and how the 
industry has approached criticism, acts as a superb example of how facilities can take 
government regulation, like CFATS practices, and incorporate a program under their own 
volition that exceeds the standards. Environmental disaster and the mitigation thereof, is 
also perfect illustration as to the cost and consequence of letting safety and risk 
management falter. Disasters of significant consequences, such as oil spills, are perfect 
examples. 
 At the time of this publication, British Petroleum has spent over $11 billion 
following the April 2010 oil rig explosion. The company has set aside a trust for another 
$20 billion to settle future claims. Coincidently, the company released a report in the fall 
of 2010 announcing a new Safety and Risk Operation promising “sweeping changes” in 
the company‟s risk and safety approach (British Petroleum, 2010). Lost in the monetary 
obligation of BP is the fact that 11 employees were killed in the explosion that spilled oil 
throughout the Gulf Coast. The following initiatives will guide facility managers through 
a psychological approach to safety rather than just a “check the box” mentality. 
Furthermore, it develops an understanding that self-regulating procedures outweigh the 
potential effects of disaster.  
 
3.2.1. International Organization for Standardization; ISO 14001.   
Non-governmental organizations can act as proponents of both industry and government. 
The intent of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is to serve as an 
institute that “enables a consensus to be reached on solutions that meet both the 
requirements of business and the broader needs of society” (International Organization 
for Standardization, 2010). The ISO, while mandated by some governmental agencies for 
particular industries under specific conditions, allows for businesses in most countries to 
understand community impact and develop procedures to continually evaluate and 
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improve operations to benefit the society in which it is located and the bottom line for the 
company. While the ISO has its own recently published, broad guideline for risk 
management, ISO 31000, a non-certification standard released in 2009, it is another 
standard on which this analysis will center.  In mining, the standard that exercises the 
aforementioned principles is ISO 14001, “Specification of Environmental Management 
Systems.” 
 Part of the ISO 14000 series, the most recent edition of the 2004 standard is 
geared toward a company‟s environmental management system which enables 
participants to freely incorporate the standard‟s principles and develop solutions to 
potential impacts to the environment. These developed systems will vary greatly with 
industry. Often, this conformity is subject to a third party check that is not only familiar 
with the industry, but also the standard. More briefly, it permits companies to develop 
measures to an improving system that allows for review and maneuver, this is a 
reasonable approach to developing an SOP against explosives-related threats as well. 
While the requirements are numerable, the gist of the program is to give a site the 
freedom to initiate its own measures, but it allows for a system of checks and balances by 
subjecting the program to continuous improvement and review by qualified professionals. 
Most participants in ISO 14001 cite tremendous advantages in implementing the 
standard. 
 A system that creates more work and uses additional resources but lowers cost 
seems counter intuitive. However, many companies participating in ISO 14001 have cited 
significant results in their investment, not to mention the benefits received once the 
public acknowledges that a strict standard has been successfully implemented under self-
regulation, all the while exceeding legislative requirements. It only makes sense, as 
discussed in Section 5, to appropriately inform the community about the company‟s 
safeguards. As noted, “the benefits…are greatly diminished if customers and the general 
public are not made aware of this achievement” (Morris, 2004). Research has shown that 
most companies agree with this opportunity to self-regulate, although many, like the 
chemical sector working under CFATS, still have questions about implementation. 
 A study published in 2003 by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
investigated the tradeoff of participating in environmental management systems. Included 
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in the findings was “positive observed impacts on the economic performance of these 
participating facilities” and more than half expressed a reduction in liability (UNC 
Department of Public Policy, 2003). These investments go further if a facility recognizes 
that the prevention of a BP-type disaster will pay even more. Other organizations use this 
same technique of self-compliance and goal-setting as a means of rendering safe 
inherently dangerous procedures. These comparisons suitably fit the mitigation of 
explosives-related threats in that the consequences, as stated earlier in the risk 
management models, are worth an authentic training mechanism that implements a 
change in human behavior and attitude.    
 
3.2.2. International Cyanide Management Code.  In keeping with the  
environmental theme, there are other organizations that rely on self-regulation. Like ISO 
14001, the International Cyanide Management Institute (ICMI) outlines a voluntary 
program that maintains the safe manufacturing, transportation and use of cyanide for gold 
producers. Cyanide is a vital chemical used in the extraction of gold ore. The institute 
acknowledges the necessity of the chemical, like the necessity of explosives consumption 
in the U.S., and provides guidelines for users of the deadly chemical to improve the 
safety and health of workers and the environment. Again, the purpose of this comparison 
is to note consistencies and benefits in programs where there is a concentration of self-
regulation with the consideration that a significant event can be devastating for the 
company. By drawing these comparisons, it is the intent of the author to bring to light 
that a facility can incorporate in its own SOP the same approach at a relatively low cost. 
This also makes a determination that if the facility fails to implement sensible ERA along 
with other countermeasures, the catastrophic outcome may be insurmountable.  
 The ICMI code is strikingly similar to the ISO 14001 standard. It urges 
participants to be “audited by an independent third party to determine the status of Code 
[sic] implementation. Those operations that meet the Code [sic] requirements can be 
certified. A unique trademark symbol can then be utilized by the certified operation. 
Audit results are made public to inform stakeholders of the status of cyanide management 
practices at the certified operation” (International Cyanide Management Institute, 2010). 
As with the ISO 14001 standard, this composition will not investigate fully the intricate 
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details of the code or any other standard, but will emphasize to facility managers the 
advantages of a similar approach. Obviously, there are the quantifiable benefits as well. 
 In a 2009 report, the ICMI code was evaluated by Dawn Garcia of SRK 
Consulting, who noted that “Benefits include lower risk operations, easier financial 
funding, and better community relations” (Garcia, 2009). Like the ISO 14001, it is 
commonly recognized that this level of transparency produces measureable advantages. 
However, to participate in the cyanide code, signatories must pay fees. Cyanide 
producers and users must conduct a cost-benefit analysis to justify participation in the 
program. Unlike BP, where billions of dollars barely dent the annual profit, this risk 
management technique must be put in the perspective of environmental damage or danger 
to human life; quite obviously the same focus for explosives attacks or incidences. 
 In 2009, an overflow from a solution pond containing sodium cyanide caused 
environmental and biological damage near a Ghana-based gold mine. In early 2010, the 
Environmental News Agency reported that the Newmont Mining would pay $5 million in 
compensation (Environmental News Agency, 2010). While there were no human deaths 
at Ahafo gold mine, the blemish on Newmont‟s reputation and perhaps the perception of 
the industry as a whole most likely will hurt worse than the slight cut from Newmont‟s 
more than a half a billion dollars first quarter earnings. This goes for BP and the oil 
industry as well. Coincidently, Newmont Mining Corporation is an ICMI code signatory 
receiving its Ahafo certification more than a year prior to the spill (Golder Associates Pty 
Ltd, 2008). According to the company, it was a technological failure, a malfunction in 
pond-level instrumentation, which led to the spill.  
 But what happens when a company has everything to lose? When compared to the 
loss of life and infrastructure from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, dead fish and 
plants have little clout. As stated in Section 1, a facility must maintain a diligent stance 
on site protection and utilize all reasonable means to protect its interests. When telecasted 
images of the bodies of small children, courageous first responders and other innocent 
civilians reach every American home, the dust will barely settle before investigations are 
launched and methods are questioned. There is a simple, low-cost approach to combat 
these devastating effects. And while owners and operators cannot guarantee the 
protection of all CIKRs, they can effectively harden the target to deterrence, and within a 
41 
 
reasonable budget, make ERA training applicable to their facility. This training must 
focus on altering the mindset of facility managers and first responders. It must allow 
flexibility in SOP development and empower security personnel to create realistic risk 
management models. Most importantly, ERA training must provide a clear foundation of 





4. EXPLOSIVES RECOGNITION AND AWARENESS TRAINING  
 Sparked by a combination of ideas, offering low-cost, comprehensive ERA 
training to law enforcement was the culmination of two experiences by the author. After 
discussing several events in which local law enforcement was exposed to potentially 
deadly explosives threats, an offer was made to organize and provide no-cost ERA 
training for police officers in the Rolla, Missouri area. Additionally, with the introduction 
of a new program at Missouri S&T, a Master of Science in Explosives Engineering, an 
effort was also undertaken to provide professional development to interested officers and 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the United States Army Engineer School 
(USAES) located at Fort Leonard Wood (FLW), Missouri. These two endeavors are the 
origination of the methodology used to develop and communicate the need for ERA for 
first responders and military professionals who typically take roles in explosives-related 
threat response, mitigation or policy. This training is a fundamental contributor to 
eliminate complacency, develop the understanding of explosives threats through 
advanced education and create awareness of explosives that has normally eluded 
technological researchers.  
 In the fall of 2010, this researcher participated in an event sponsored by 
Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts, the home of the DHS COE for 
explosives-related threats, dubbed the Research and Industrial Collaboration Conference 
(RICC). The annual event is geared to bring together those in industry and academia to 
establish a better transition of technologies, most used in explosives detection, from 
college and national labs to the personnel in the field. Again, while this is a noble effort, 
the discouraging discovery made by this author is that most of the researchers have never 
witnessed a high-explosive detonation nor did they understand the concept of adequate 
standoff. A suicide bomber is capable of carrying explosives to cause death at hundreds 
of meters; explosives detection technology presented at the RICC touted standoff 
distances 50 meters or less. These researchers, like law enforcement, are in need of 
pertinent ERA training as to better develop the technology used by security professionals. 
 With the cooperation of Dr. Jason Baird, an explosives expert from Missouri 
S&T, ERA training at Missouri S&T was first introduced in the fall of 2009. Initially, 
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members of the Phelps County Sheriff‟s Department participated. The goal was to 
introduce basic knowledge of explosives and explosives devices to first responders 
operating in close proximity to the storage and usage of explosives. The topics include 
explosives regulations and guidelines, safety and handling, demonstrations of high and 
low explosives, initiators and initiation systems, special detonators, and hazards 
associated with explosives. 
The ERA training quickly gained the interest of other departments and within the 
next year 30 officers participated from not only the sheriff‟s office, but also Rolla Police 
Department, Rolla Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Missouri S&T Police 
(University Police), reserve training officers and two special agents from the FBI. There 
are ongoing efforts to bring agents from the ATF and employees from the Missouri State 
Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) as well as private industry professionals. 
 A survey was created in order to tailor the ongoing training to fit the needs of the 
participants. An example of the survey is shown in Appendix D. Survey analysis and 
results are discussed in the subsequent text in this section. 
Each ERA participant was asked to complete a survey that required five 
quantitative responses and three qualitative answers. For the quantitative responses, a 
range from one to five was used to score the familiarity and interest of the participant, 
and the significance and effectiveness of the training. The applicability rating, ranging 
from one to five, is as follows: 
 
1-not at all, 2-slightly, 3-somewhat, 4-very, 5-extremely. 
 
For instance, if an officer is asked how familiar she is with explosives, circling the 
numeral one would indicate no familiarity and five would indicate expert familiarity. The 
following by-question analysis gives insight as to the pertinence of ERA to law 
enforcement officers who completed the survey. 
 





Out of 29 responses the mean answer was 4.55. This indicates that training 
provided was between “very” and “extremely” effective. This shows that officers 
felt more educated and informed about explosives after completing the training. 
This awareness equates to a psychological advantage when responding to an 
explosives-related threat especially to those operating within close proximity to 
explosives storage and transportation 
 
Question 2: How effective was the instructor(s) at presenting the material? 
 
All participants with the exception of two indicated that the instructors were 
extremely effective in conveying the training topics. The average was 4.93, which 
shows that the trainers at Missouri S&T utilized proven teaching techniques and 
generated sufficient interest through demonstrations, discussion and visual aids. 
Current information, such as recent failed IED attempts within the U.S., was used 
to reinforce learning and make it applicable to the profession. 
 
Question 3: At your present level, how significant are explosives-related 
threats? 
 
Two-thirds of the participants scored a four or five, indicating that they believed 
within their current role, they will encounter an IED. The response average was a 
3.93, showing that most respondents felt that there is a “very” significant threat of 
an explosives event occurring within their community. A reality confirmed by 
Question 8. Only one participant indicated a score lower than three.  
 
Question 4: How interested are you in participating in more advanced 
explosives training? 
 
The mean for interest in future training was 4.28. These results indicate that future 
advanced ERA training would be of significant interest to most trainees. One 





Question 5: Prior to taking this training, how familiar were you with 
explosives and explosives-related threats? 
 
Out of 29 responses, nearly all were scored a three or less. The average familiarity 
score was 2.1, indicating that this training increased the ERA for most of the 
attendees as this was their first significant explosives training session in which 
they felt more aware of the potential threats. Couple this with the results of 
Question 1, there is no doubt that emergency response professionals need and 
welcome the training.  
 
The survey‟s three quantitative questions 6-8 were collected and categorized into 
major responses. This portion of the survey acts as a written AAR in which participants 
can provide written feedback to improve the training for the next group. Also addressed 
is the exposure of trainees to explosives-related threats.  
 
Question 6:  What are your recommendations for improving this course? 




















 Among the most popular suggestions for improving the training was the addition 
of more IED identification. Approximately the same number of respondents offered no 
comment to the question, or leaving the answer blank. If this answer is assumed to mean 
that officers have no suggestions and were satisfied with the course, then this answer 
could be married with the group who responded that nothing should be changed. If this is 
the case, then half of the trainees were completely content with the basic intent of the 
ERA training. The need for more IED training has been addressed by instructors and IED 
training simulators, smart cards and references have been added. However, this material 
has yet to be used in a training session. 
 In keeping with an authentic AAR, officers were also asked to provide feedback 
over what they felt should be kept in the training. 
 






Figure 4.2. Recommended sustains to ERA training 
 
 
Overwhelmingly, those participating in the training expressed that the explosives 















they felt the training provided a good foundation of explosives knowledge. Out of the 29 
respondents, 21-percent offered no answer. Like Question 6, an officer offering no 
response either had no pertinent feedback or believed the training was adequate.  
The final question of the ERA survey addresses the applicability of the training to 
those serving in a law enforcement capacity. The question was used to determine how 
often, if at all, local officials were faced with a genuine explosives-related threat.  
 
Question 8: During your career, have you ever experienced an explosives 
threat  on the job? Explain. 
 
Out of 25 responses, 16 revealed that they have indeed come into contact with 
explosives devices or have been called to an explosives-related threat, the majority being 
bomb threats. That is 64-percent of first responders who have experienced a significant 
threat. Marry that number with the absence of previous explosives training and the 
conclusion is a grim reminder that after so many explosives attacks and threats, the 
nation‟s initial response personnel are still not equipped with the knowledge they need to 
protect the community and themselves. What‟s more, once discussing particular cases, it 
was revealed that oftentimes inexperienced officers would carelessly handle and store 
explosive devices and even transport the “bomb” in the same vehicle as passengers. 
There were other significant discoveries as well. 
During informal discussions with trainees, another important observation was 
made. Several local officers were unaware of the amount of explosives stored on or near 
campus and many did not know if the university‟s explosives storage was part of the 
local emergency response plan. This pertains to law enforcement officials‟ perception 
that they will likely face an explosives-related threat. Even more staggering is the thought 
that firefighters may also be ignorant of the aforementioned observation. Like a police 
officer pursuing the source of gun fire, an active shooter, firefighters are trained to 
extinguish fire. But if these brave souls are unaware of the fact that the fire they are 
attempting to extinguish is in close proximity to explosives storage, the catastrophic 




In November 1988, Kansas City, Missouri firefighters responded to an early 
morning arson fire on a construction site. The construction company was using a blasting 
agent comprised of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, commonly known as ANFO. 
Although initial emergency response calls indicated that explosives were on site and 
possibly ablaze, the exact location of the magazines containing the explosives was not 
known. Firefighters were also unaware of improper storage prior to the response; which 
included unacceptable safe distances to nearby structures and thoroughfares and between 
the two magazines that exploded. When firefighters arrived on scene to battle the blaze, 
two explosions consisting of tens of thousands of pounds of ANFO and dynamite claimed 
the lives of all six responders. In a subsequent report by the United States Fire 
Administration, investigator Jack Yates concluded that if the seasoned firefighters had 
known the exact location of the explosives and the magazines were marked, this tragedy 
perhaps could have been avoided (Yates, 1989). Although there were no marking 
requirements for the magazines themselves, and considering the fire would have 
destroyed the placard anyway, just by having the fire department visit the site and discuss 
the company‟s emergency response plan involving explosives would have led to greater 
communication, a fundamental for ERA. 
 As discussed in Section 5, ERA is a basic component of a more elaborate site 
security model that includes all relevant responders. The ERA instructors in this 
particular instance encouraged law enforcement to become better familiar with 
emergency management directors and the local emergency management plan. With ERA 
training, first responders can be better prepared psychologically for appropriately dealing 
with such instances. 
There is a current effort to expand ERA training to other pertinent agencies. 
Besides law enforcement, fire departments and other emergency relief workers would 
benefit from such training. The goal is to provide an explosives education to those who 
may be exposed to such threats. ATF offices and the Missouri State Emergency 
Management Agency (SEMA) have expressed interest in taking part in the ERA classes. 
There has also been expressed interest by private security consultants as well. To date, no 
courses have been scheduled for these entities. However, great strides have been taken to 
make the advanced explosives education available to the U.S. military. 
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Also a part of the ERA training was providing Officer Professional Development 
(OPD) to components of the USAES at FLW. This initial effort was the development of a 
previously unidentified focus group for the DHS ALERT education initiative. However, 
the briefings spawned a storm of interest in the recently approved Explosives Engineering 
Master of Science degree from Missouri S&T. 
The first session was conducted with approximately 50 officers and NCOs with 
the 1
st
 Engineer Brigade. Traditional combat engineers are tasked with explosives 
demolition, breaching and providing explosives clearance services to supported units. 
The ERA training consisted much of what was offered at the university as well as 
presenting ideas of explosives implementation and explosives products. The intent was to 
establish advanced explosives education to future retirees who would potentially pursue 
employment with the federal government. As mentioned in previous sections, there are 
few colleges in the world that can provide this training at an advanced level. In its 
original capacity, ALERT was designed to recruit such professionals in order to enhance 
the nation‟s pool of explosives professionals. While the goal was to incorporate the intent 
with high school and college students, this researcher organized the military effort to 
establish a more cooperative explosives education relationship with the USAES. The 
initial training was attended by commanders at all levels of the brigade and, while there 
are no official surveys or reviews, received tremendous positive feedback which inspired 
an OPD with the USAES commandant Brigadier General Bryan Watson. General Watson 
provided an additional 20 soldiers to attend the same training which resulted in 
astonishing interest in the explosives engineering program. These participants were 
oblivious to most of the resources and capabilities of the department, although located 
less than 30 miles away. There are ongoing efforts to provide a degree track for soldiers 
interested in the explosives engineering program and it is anticipated that the original 
intent of the ALERT initiative will be met. 
The next step of ERA is to incorporate the training into a genuine site security 
plan. Although site security personnel have not attended the ERA training discussed in 
this document, it is vital that those tasked with guarding infrastructure undertake a role in 




5. SITE AWARENESS OF FIRING AND EXPLOSIVES DEVICES 
Facilities must have the means of routinely verifying their site protection plan. A 
location, upon its own risk management process, can develop a tactical pilot and then 
spot check its progress by conducting realistic and applicable exercises. These exercises 
must be periodic and practical and include a proper evaluation or, as in the military, an 
AAR. The AAR is used to identify sustains and desired improvements to the training 
without targeting individual participants. It clearly defines the goal and details the 
process of execution to determine if pre-exercise goals were met. The AAR includes all 
participants. Without vital participant feedback, the facility may not meet the continuous 
improvement requirement as outlined in Section 3. 
This program suggests the implementation of human factor solutions to combat 
bunker mentality and complacency. To alleviate concerns with organizational 
complacency, employees involved with a task must be routinely challenged. Each month, 
this author, armed with a uniform and military identification card, is enthusiastically 
waved onto a Missouri military installation. The guard charged with recognizing threat 
has become so removed from danger that the identification card is rarely checked. This 
mentality exists because the guard is not tested and 9-11 has long passed. 
When the consequences and threat potential, as discussed in Section 3, weigh 
heavy on those charged with protection, then a climate of preservation will prevail, but 
there also must be a focus on crisis management. There are several approaches to 
motivate participants to remain vigilant in their task. During a 2005 tour supporting 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, this author was part of a team tasked to train coalition forces in 
combat operations. The first week in the area of operations, a complex ambush resulted in 
the deaths of five Iraqi soldiers. Their vehicle, partially destroyed by an IED, was 
splattered with the blood of the brave soldiers. As a constant reminder of the inherent 
threat in combat, the Iraqi commander parked the truck near the entrance of the small 
base. Everyone entering or exiting the base could see the truck and was continuously 
reminded of the peril. While this is a drastic and grim example, this type of visual 
reinforcement can be used in other industries. There is reinforcement through repetition 
training as well. 
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The military typically trains recruits through redundancy. Warriors are created 
through constant exposure to repeated tasks, formally known as “battle drills.” The 
purpose of a battle drill is to instill into a soldier an instinctive reaction under adverse 
circumstances. This is the military approach to implant crisis management skills to the 
lowest level employee thus ensuring mission success. This realistic trained response 
incorporates critical thinking skills in order to preserve the mission and resources and 
allows for soldiers to continue the mission regardless of location, leadership or other 
influences and surprises. In his book On Killing, retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave 
Grossman and former West Point psychology professor states that the military objective 
during the American Civil War was to use “mind-numbingly repetitive drill” to “turn a 
soldier into a small cog in a machine…ensuring the he would do his duty on the 
battlefield” (Grossman, 1995). Grossman stresses that this psychological mechanism, a 
significant emphasis in the military, is a product of recreating realistic conditions in 
addition to the redundancy, and is a method used in other professions as well. He says the 
technique is “used when training firemen and airline pilots to react to emergency 
situations: precise replication of the stimulus that they will face (in a flame house or 
flight simulator) and then extensive shaping of the desired response to that stimulus. 
Stimulus-response, stimulus-response, stimulus-response. In the crisis, when these 
individuals are scared out of their wits, they react properly and they save lives” 
(Grossman, 1995). Perhaps the most notable example of this viewpoint is the emergency 
aircraft landing in the Hudson River. 
In January 2009, Captain Chesley Sullenberger, coincidently a former U.S. Air 
Force pilot, conducted the emergency landing of a U.S. Airways passenger jet after 
multiple bird strikes to the aircraft‟s engines. Following the landing, Sullenberger, whose 
voice transmissions to both flight control and the passengers were remarkably calm 
throughout the ordeal, only exited the plane after checking the cabin twice. The pilot 
responsible for saving 155 lives that day later admitted in an interview that Grossman‟s 
observations are with merit. The hero told interviewer Katie Couric “It was the worst 
sickening, pit-of-your-stomach, falling-through-the-floor feeling I've ever felt in my life” 
and credited a lifetime of education and training as the deciding factors (CBS News, 
2009). The same methods of realistic, repetitive training that prepared Sullenberger must 
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be included when directing site security operations. There also variety contained within 
the mission. 
To alleviate boredom, rotational work must be emplaced. An event must occur 
and be unpredictable to test the security staff and emergency response personnel. Site 
security personnel must be tested within the scope of their duties. Additionally, the 
preferred method of sustainability is via positive reinforcement, such as in canine 
training, rather than negative repercussions. To achieve complete site awareness of firing 
and explosives devices (SAFE-D), an all-inclusive approach must be established. This 
section provides a five-phase outline for a suggested program in which facility managers 
can employ, but does not serve to address every aspect of concern specific to every 
industry. This psychological training model begins with ERA in the “familiarization” 
phase; incorporates knowledge and practical exercise in the “application” phase; develops 
sensible SOPs with third-party review in the “validation” phase; conducts comprehensive 
review during the “evaluation” phase; and finally utilizes the “retention” phase for 
continuous focus on the protection plan. An easy acronym to recognize the tool: Facilities 
must do themselves a “faver” [sic] by implementing SAFE-D.  A comprehensive 
decision-making matrix for SAFE-D implementation is included in Appendix E. The 
SAFE-D cyclical model in shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. The SAFE-D model 
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Phase 1 focuses on obtaining ERA training for appropriate personnel. Depending 
on the institution, the facility managers should also be familiar with the LERP, especially 
for facilities storing explosives. As discussed in Section 4, local police officers were not 
aware of the storage of explosives in their community nor could they recall the 
emergency management director for the city or the LERP. To establish a legitimate risk 
management plan and SOP, all of those involved in disaster response must come to the 
table. The time to meet these officials is not when there is an explosives incident. Rather, 
initial ERA training should include site security personnel and the local and state 
agencies responsible for supporting the facility in the event of an explosives attack. In 
keeping with the goals outlined in Section 1.2, providing ERA training to all of those 
potential actors in a location in close proximity to the potential target allows 
familiarization and networking functions to occur during the training. Officials can take 
this time to exchange contact information, ideas and further critique the LERP as it 
pertains to the facility. Much of this will naturally occur during informal discussions, but 
the initial ERA training is not only to serve as a foundation for explosives and component 
awareness, but also as a conduit for original thought and information sharing. The initial 
training should be designed to put names to faces and identify who should respond to an 
explosives-related threat in order to prevent crowding of onsite personnel. This point is 
revisited in Phase 5. 
Considering many emergency response personnel have little experience with 
explosives, as seen in the surveys of the ERA training conducted at Missouri S&T, the 
initial training should encompass basic explosives training lasting 16-24 hours. 
Principles, like those listed in Section 4, should act as a transitional function. The training 
must bring the threat to the participants by using realistic material to which the trainees 
can relate. Baird‟s ERA session accomplished this goal. The explosives educator begins 
the training event by showing video of international law enforcement improperly 
handling IEDs. While graphic, the video serves to remind police officers of the 
consequences carelessness can cause. Additionally, demonstrations of high explosives are 
also used to fortify the point that just a small amount of explosives can have a major 
impact in close proximity. By witnessing firsthand the power of a high explosive, officers 
can put into perspective future training scenarios where proper standoff can be 
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implemented. Initial ERA training should be annually reinforced with no less than an 8-
hour refresher course. This is discussed in Phase 4. 
The next phase is the practical exercise portion of the SAFE-D program. It 
encompasses all the training acquired by security professional and first responders and 
brings together a realistic test of the effectiveness of the training. Each training scenario 
must be followed by an immediate AAR to ensure timely feedback of the participants. 
Security professionals and first responders can alternate hosting exercises, but each 
training event should always occur within the professionals‟ operational scope and in the 
location of the potential attack or incident. Training aids can consist of make shift IEDs 
or suspicious components of explosives devices. Exercise participants must focus on 
applicable explosives counter measures and effective response. The key is to prevent the 
detonation, and not to necessarily respond to a blast. Drawing again on the military, these 
exercises can be community based and phased into a crawl, walk, run application; 
meaning that a briefing on the exercise should be orally delivered to actors and an onsite 
walk-through should occur prior to a live exercise. This is when the ERA training should 
be incorporated into site security and SOPs originate. The exercise pilot should be a 
standard event which pertains to the facility. More elaborate schemes can be devised 
from the AARs and SOP revisions occurring in the evaluation phase. 
In the third phase, managers will use lessons learned from the exercise and 
incorporate improvements and seek additional resources. The SOP will be continuously 
refined as threats vary, but this should be the main effort in developing a facility‟s 
original, and most complete, SOP. The most critical aspect of SOP guidelines is 
communicating the standard and distributing to all levels the owner‟s intent as it pertains 
to combating explosives-related threats. While common sense is a great tool for onsite 
security professionals to mitigate their own risk, managers should seek additional low-
cost resources. These can come in the form of academic expertise, industry partner 
review and governmental input that validates the organization‟s efforts. During this 
phase, the facility should attempt to deliver a final product that addresses fully the risk 
management process and hazards identified as well as any special criteria that each 
location must consider. For example, for a plant located in close proximity of school, 
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additional criteria would include school hours and traffic.  Once these guidelines have 
been reviewed appropriately, it is time to test the full product. 
Phase 4 is a training evaluation. Site operators will use the refined SOP, current 
threat and updated intelligence, and pending a third party audit, to retrain as necessary. 
This is the time to develop a routine method of testing security plans and personnel. The 
testing must develop several criteria in order to be successful, it must: 
 Be unpredictable and unannounced 
 Test within the scope of the training 
 Assign no personal blame for security flaws 
 Be measurable 
 Ensure feedback is timely 
 Allow for variance 
 Be incentive based 
 In the military, many of these approaches are undertaken in evaluating battle 
drills. Once a platoon or squad has rehearsed continuously the applicable drill, variations 
are added to enhance the crisis management potential of the soldiers. One of the favorite 
approaches for first line supervisors is to remove the traditional leader from the training 
and evaluate the remaining troops‟ ability to continue the flow of the mission with 
minimal interruption. In just one battle drill, a leader can evaluate all of the criteria 
mentioned above and follow up the training with an AAR that addresses pertinent 
successes and shortcomings and assigns those to the method and not the individual 
soldier. Incentives in the military often come in the form of general competiveness and 
satisfaction of being a well-trained, ready-for-combat unit. Soldiers respond to training 
evaluation the same as winning a football game. Except the triumph in battle certainly 
has greater weight. This approach again allows for each facility to develop its own 
standard, but there are simple approaches to consider. 
 The military uses “spot checks” to ensure soldier readiness. This is a sporadic 
check of equipment or knowledge that is assumed to be readily available. However, the 
scope guarantees a soldier will not be tested on something he is not expected to know. 
The psychological effect of having a leader randomly perform this function keeps the 
soldier aware. Site security personnel must undergo the same scrutiny, however, like the 
56 
 
soldier, should not be tested on something outside of ERA or the scope of the site 
security training. Once these tests take place, the site‟s security teams will develop the 
same “esprit de corps” as a platoon and challenge each other to be diligent for nothing 
more than bragging rights. The feeling of success gained by these teams will pay 
extraordinary dividends and challenge others to excel. In contrast, the identification of 
defects must not be personal. One security guard missing a simulated IED does not 
constitute a failure in the entire system or a lack of concern from that individual. The 
collective process should be addressed and not the blame game. Incentives can also be 
used. 
 Perhaps the most significant, driving force in a time of peace is money. However, 
in a time of war, preservation of life and property become more prevalent. Like investing 
in risk management, a company is best served investing in the prevention of injury rather 
than the compensation to hurt employees. The same applies to SAFE-D. Even small non-
monetary bonuses, for instance a pool of company merchandise or a company certificate, 
convey the pertinence of the program. Having time off will work as well. Another 
approach in the Army is to reward attentiveness. For example, a unit‟s maintenance 
program may test individuals by purposely creating mechanical flaws on a vehicle. 
Soldiers identifying and correcting all of the flaws may be permitted to leave work early 
or may simply be recognized in the presence of their peers and leaders. This is effective 
and contagious, as long as the soldiers are astute to the procedure and tested within the 
scope of their ability. Like previously discussed scenarios, incentives, along with the 
other criteria, should be based on the company‟s needs and project a continuing 
investment in site security from explosives-related threats. A well-trained security force 
is comparable to any detection measure a facility can purchase. 
The fifth phase is the retention phase. Tests and scenario-based exercises will 
continue as deemed necessary. Local law enforcement must participate in the training as 
a means of total understanding of explosives-related threats. As well, this should include 
other pertinent emergency response possessing a genuine role in the training. As seen 
with Eric Rudolph, the Atlanta bomber during the 1996 Olympics, an actual explosive 
event may just be a method of gathering more targets for a more intense detonation. 
Agencies can alternate training responsibility and take turns hosting significant training 
57 
 
events. During this phase, ERA refresher courses are given and daily intelligence is 
addressed in risk management. Anytime a pertinent change in physical or operational 
structure occurs within the facility, the SOP must be revisited and altered plans must be 
conveyed again to all members who hold a stake in the site‟s protection. As discussed 
Section 3.2, this is a time for review and improvement, just as the environmental 
management system implies. These adjustments could be additions or alterations to the 
plan, such as investing more money into equipment or canines. As well, it is a time to 
inform the surrounding community that significant safeguards are in place to protect the 
infrastructure and the population.  
As mentioned, the SAFE-D program, although strictly based on explosives-
related threats, is not intended to cure entirely a facility‟s security woes. Like the Army‟s 
approach to risk management, it is indeed designed to teach security professionals “how 
to think” and not “what to think.” Elaborate detection systems are designed to present 
possible risks as a computer may interpret the threat. This method takes away the initial 
gut instinct and critical thinking process the human factor brings to the table. SAFE-D is 
also not a substitution for standoff barriers and detection systems. Rather, it is designed to 
be coupled with existing technologies and protective measures. It gives a facility the 
opportunity to design low-cost, sensible solutions to what consultants may claim is a 
complex problem. Complacency is an ongoing problem for site managers. SAFE-D is a 






 The United States obviously has a legitimate policy in place to deter and detect 
explosives-related threats. Each year, massive spending is allocated to provide the force 
with the most sophisticated sensor equipment and barriers. However, absent from the 
well-intentioned strategy is a cost-effective training program that focuses on explosives 
recognition and awareness and not just the technological aspect of detection and 
protection. This psychological shortcoming, albeit a simplistic one, has created a 
substantial effort to invest hundreds of billions of dollars into systems without marrying 
that bankroll with a common-sense approach to train security professionals on the basic 
principles of explosives-related threats. SAFE-D can enable first responders and facility 
managers to create and sustain their own policy; one of which is free of government 
reliance and error. 
 Countless companies today offer consultancy services for those willing to pay for 
a relatively sensible approach to IED detection. As part of these services, IED training 
kits and lessons on standoff protection are included as necessary components of ERA. 
SAFE-D, a comprehensive approach pertinent to any location grants the liberty for each 
facility to assess its own risk and apply dynamic SOPs in a continuous manner; all the 
while empowering the facility to develop low-cost solutions to site protection. These 
third-party-review methods, as specifically outlined in the previous text, already exist in 
other industry and can be appropriately adapted to fit the needs of the facility. 
Additionally, better crosstalk between interested parties must be incorporated. 
 A company cannot rely solely on the federal establishment or a single 
technological solution. Like the attempted Time‟s Square bombing in 2010, in which an 
attentive police officer noticed a smoking device inside a vehicle, ERA must trickle down 
to the lowest level, where those professionals are likely to come into contact with the 
threat. By knowing just the fundamentals of explosives, that police officer will not only 
be able to recognize the threat, but also would understand the potential of the blast and 
the necessary evacuation area and can ultimately prevent devastating blast effects like 
those in the 1988 explosion in Kansas City. By observing components of the explosive 
device, that police officer may be able to make a determination as to whether the threat is 
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legitimate or a distracter for a secondary event. It makes little sense for an executive to 
attend the training outside of an assessment perspective. Psychologically, security 




7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 The next logical rung for research progression would be to test SAFE-D at a 
legitimate facility and expand ERA to a network of professionals with a shared interest in 
explosives-related threat protection. 
 Any company, school or hospital, has a legitimate concern for site safety. To 
move forward, the SAFE-D outline must be tested under a voluntary basis for the 
applicable facility. Site security managers can take these principles and incorporate the 
phase into the SSP, the risk management process and their own SOPs. Each facility can 
task employees, who are already the experts on the hazards present in the work 
environment, to produce a genuine plan that begins with ERA and validates under a 
collective training exercise involving local and state officials. Further, SAFE-D can be a 
supplementary program to a site‟s already functioning security plan. Operators can take 
phases of the plan and adjust them to fit specific needs intrinsic to the site. 
 Perhaps the easiest aspect of this research to advance is the ERA training. 
Creating a network, in which much of the leg work has already been started, to bring 
explosives-related threat training from governmental entities and academia to not only 
first responders, but significant security contractors tasked with protecting CIKR and the 
nation‟s most valued resources, people, is an obligation. The training must be available to 
school resource officers, law enforcement and security forces tasked with guarding 
vulnerable patients. As seen in Russia, this training can prove invaluable in thwarting 
future attacks. 
 Lastly, to expand fully the advantages of SAFE-D, it must be incorporated into 
the LERP for each community. For example, for each facility concerned either with 
housing significant numbers of employees or visitors, or those involved with CIKR, there 
must be a development of SOPs that involves emergency response. SAFE-D allows for 
all incident responders, whether manmade or natural, to come together in rehearsal rather 
than waiting for the tragedy to transpire to establish vital communications and procedures 
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